many forms of culture

Every week for my cultural psychology course we are asked to submit a short (2 page) reaction to one or two of the readings. This week's class is titled 'Many forms of culture,' here is my response to a couple of the articles we read:

This week’s theme is less explicit than previous weeks. Although it evidently takes its name from Adam Cohen’s (2009) paper, it’s unclear what forms are being evoked here. Cohen writes that it is the purpose of his article to propose psychologists explore “more kinds of variation among more kinds of cultures” (p.194), a suggestion mirroring those Shweder (1995) made nearly two decades earlier. This plea for “more kinds” raises two concerns for me. The first is whether an increasingly broader understanding of ‘culture’ is the most effective way to address current limitations in the way psychology deals with social beings, and the second is about why these arguments (about the importance of nuance and difference) need to emerge repeatedly to remind mainstream psychologists of the social realities in which they conduct their work. Thinking about the first concern, I ask myself about the utility of expanding the scope of cultural consideration without first exploring more cultural theory (ex: do cultural effects associated with religion trump those of SES?). Do anthropologists really “despair” at the prospect of defining culture as Cohen suggests (p.195), and, must our thinking about culture be restricted by the number of subvariables we can invent to talk it? In terms of the second concern, I am surprised (in 2009) that Cohen is explaining, in a mainstream scholarly journal (American Psychologist), the merit of taking seriously differences among cultural dimensions such as religion, socioeconomic status and geographic regions. Should we also be preparing and outline explaining the role of collective history and its importance for making claims about the complex social and mental lives of individuals? Although I definitely agree with his overall recommendation for greater specificity (ex: when selecting group membership), I am also somewhat disappointed with the typical detached and apolitical stance towards examining SES and class based issues. Part of my feelings about this comes from my understanding that although matters of religion and region are often beyond our choosing or influence, the actions of others (ex: welfare policies) have a direct bearing on the experience of SES as a specific social outcome. I believe there is real lost opportunity when psychologists choose not to acknowledge this difference by relegating it to solely descriptive terms.

Another article that highlighted the importance of examining socioeconomic class was Stephens et al. (2007). Their studies on the meaning ascribed to actions of choosing in different socioeconomic contexts was fascinating. I especially liked the authors’ engagement with the topic of the relation between social class and (access to) education through the investigation of differing models of agency. Indeed, this article got me thinking a lot about how psychologist employ the concept of ‘agency.’ For example, Stephens et al. ask in their closing discussion: “If choice and control afford agency, and working class contexts provide fewer opportunities to experience choice and control, then should we conclude that people in working class contexts have relatively less agency?” To which they respond, “… choice is likely to be less central to agency… we do not conclude that working class contexts promote relatively less agency…” (p.827). What then is agency? Is it something that can describe someone (i.e., something one possesses), or is it a state of mind (i.e., a belief one holds)? Could ignoring this distinction and emphasizing the cultural relativity of choice justify the practices of cultures that engage in practices of oppression? Do working class people have less control over their surroundings, and if this results in attitudes and behaviors that psychologists are able to identify as the typical adaptive responses to (unjust) hardship, should we not use this knowledge to speak out against what we understand as the proximal causes of these conditions (e.g., poverty, education, health)?

Cohen, A. B. (2009). Many forms of culture. American Psychologist, 64, 194-204.

Stephens, N. M., Markus, H. R., & Townsend, S. S. M. (2007). Choice as an act of meaning: THe case of social class. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 814-830.

my problem with willpower

I have a problem with willpower as an explanatory concept of behaviour. It is thoroughly ingrained in our understanding of discipline and self-management, a central part of Western philosophical thought. But, do we really do things because of willpower? Or, phrased in a more familiar way, is it really because we lack willpower that we are unable to do certain things (ex: quit smoking, exercise more)? To be sure, willpower is a slippery concept; we can use it to mean desire, some sort of personal motivating force ('will to power'), or commonly, inhibition and self-control. I am particularly intrigued with definitions of willpower within a disciplinary context, as pushing against and contorting our behaviours towards some directed purpose (ex: mobilizing willpower towards the completion of some task).

But how accurate are we when to attribute the failure to fulfill an ambition as a deficiency of willpower? There is an implicit assumption built into these causal explanations that identifies the source of the problem to certain conditions while ignoring others. It is tempting to think that the solution is simply more of what is lacking, more willpower, more desire: You didn't want it bad enough. Locating the site of intervention in the body facilitates this individualizing approach and finds resolution in . This is problematic because that which compels some behaviours while inhibiting others is not a quantitative matter, but rather a qualitative reality enmeshed and emergent through a complex economy of desire. Quite simply, we do things because we want to, but we want many things.

I think this point has the potential to turn willpower (which is often conceived as "free won't") on its head. At its core, the exercise of the will is desire enacted; the trading of proximal for distal goals. The willpower is reflected not as self-domination, but self-knowledge. Willpower should be thought less of a resource we expend or a currency we exchange, and more as an interest among many competing for our attention and our release. It does not replace or supercede rival bids, rather, the invocation of "willpower" brings to bear a particular narrative of individual autonomy, of personal triumph, of free agency. It is a toolbox that serves, but also obscures.

The individualization brought about through the discursive uses of this concept figure prominently in modern subjectivities. I am curious about the way in which our general acceptance of primacy of the will undercuts, by shaping and pro-offering a certain selection of solutions and management techniques, the ways in which we can live harmoniously with our environments, our work, and others.

choices

I feel that last week was an important turning point in my life. I was rejected from medical school. This came about one month after, what I thought was, a successful interview. I was obviously disappointed, and I would be lying if I said I wasn't at least a little upset. Even though I was trying to monitor my emotional investment (to avoid becoming too entangled in a long shot), I was not completely successful in insulating myself from the affective. This rejection came the day after I fo
und out the scholarship to which I applied was denied. These events were discouraging for both my prospective paths, medicine and academia. One week later, it's still hard to pin down exactly what prevented me from getting accepted. Having gotten an interview on my first application at least suggests it was probably something minor, but significant -- I imagine my relatively low GPA and lack of diverse experiences in healthcare/medicine probably negatively affected my chances while my context score (i.e., where I grew up and have lived) and my questionnaire (autobiographical sketch) probably carried me into the interview. Unfortunately, it was not enough to get me a spot in the 2012 entering class. Oh well.

So, will I try again? I've thought about this a lot; it is a long and expensive process (applications are due in early October and you don't hear back until mid-May; costs about $150 to apply, $200 to write the MCAT, and depending on where the interview is, that costs money too). I am reading the fact I got an interview, which I was not expecting, as a sign that I am a genuine prospective candidate. I know my [now] completed Master's degree was not applied to my cGPA and that my experiences (volunteering, research) have been minimal so far. These are things that would bolster my acceptance potential. I think I will apply again. Not this year (the deadline would be less than five months away), but maybe the following (2014 entering class), there is much to be done in the meantime.

In the Fall I will return to school for the second year of my PhD. I will focus on completing my coursework (I have six semester-long courses left) and then working on getting my practicum and minor area paper prepared as well. I will also begin working towards a diploma program (in Health Psychology) which should dovetail nicely with my other requirements. Until recently, I was thinking the next big life (i.e., career) decision I will have to make will be between continuing toward my graduate degree or drop out in order to focus on improving my application (mainly through volunteer and work experiences) for entry into medical school. Now I am beginning to think it may not necessarily be an either/or situation.

This summer I will continue to search for volunteer, internship, and research positions outside my immediate academic interests. I will aim towards getting more involved in the intersections between health and social justice, and I will specifically seek to work with the vulnerable and under-serviced. I am convinced that it is through this engagement with people and ongoing social issues that my work in academia will find meaning and purpose. This practical work will be complimented by a reading course that I am working on with my advisor. This reading course will supplement my understanding of social theory as it applies to issues, challenges, and critiques brought forth by the 'neuro-disciplines' (with a focus on foucaultian discourse analysis, biopolitics, and biopower). Tomorrow I will meet with my advisor to discuss these plans.

Perhaps I can complete both my PhD (in 2015) and then go to medical school (enter Fall 2015; complete 2019)? At this moment, this idea captures me: continue to volunteer/work in health-related activities (including minor area paper; Health Psychology Diploma); complete PhD; then enter medical school with a solid background in the medical humanities. This will be a long run, but I feel that if I allow myself to live in present, take advantage of the opportunities that come my way, continue to improve my academic skills (i.e., writing, teaching), and allow my interests to flourish (history/sociology/anthropology of medicine) then even if things don't go the way I've outlined here, I'll be where I want to be.